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Contextualized in human history, the modern nation-state is a new phenomenon that is 
constantly evolving. International relations have been organized based on the concepts 
of international treaties that are over three centuries old that assured autonomy. After the 
end of the cold war, a move towards international cooperation with new terminology 
emerged to articulate some of the trends. However, the early 21st century has seen a 
rejection of the “New World Order”, with movements towards a return to an anarchistic, 
more traditional order. While the expectations of the liberal order were at its peak just 
after the collapse of the USSR and Francis Fukuyama declared “The End of History,” 
the events of September 11, 2001 marked a sharp turn in the world’s hegemonic power 
away from institutions and systems that provided transnational governance. This has 
meant a return to the original international order seen in the 19th and 20th century 
characterized by the repositioning of world powers. This paper will examine recent 
trends through the framework of several evolving international relations theories. 
____________________
* Osaka Jogakuin University 
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1. Introduction 
International relations (IR) is defined as the study of the interactions of state 
actors as they interact with each other (Jones, 1988). The discipline is therefore 
concerned with the actions of various nations, and what drives their domestic political 
agendas to behave the way that they do-after all political forces affect patterns of 
international trade, investment, and production (Keohane, 1986).  
It is often argued in IR that the Westphalian system of government is about to 
end, which often signifies that each state possesses exclusive level of sovereignty over 
its territory. As contended by Osiander (2001), while analyzing contemporary 
international politics, this Westphalian system, with the concept of sovereignty at its 
core, has turned out largely as imaginary, and countries are trying to move ‘beyond 
Westphalia’. The hegemonic aspirations of the world superpowers have undermined this 
system quite significantly. Furthermore, as a result of industrialization, growing 
interdependence has continuously challenged the states’ capacity for self-reliance. This 
is accompanied by the proliferation of international institutions that are trying to 
influence trans-border politics. As a result, today’s international system is gradually 
moving away from the Westphalian model. 
In IR, groupthink, sometimes referred to as entitativity, where groups are in an 
almost biological sense (Brauer, Castano, & Sacchi, 2009) creates a situation where the 
group then becomes subjective to multilevel selection (Field, 2004).  Creating 
cooperation amongst people, Turchin (2009) explains, is a necessity in order to inflict 
damage on another group. While that might seem obvious, he furthers that to achieve 
this collaboration, multilevel selection is a framework that helps explain the 
requirement of cooperation. As this is applicable at all levels the framework helps 
explain not only state nationalism, but also global order in an anarchistic world.  But, 
within the confines of states and their dealing with others, it is important to remember 
that nationalism, “is not universal human dignity, but dignity for their group” 
(Fukuyama, 1992 p. 266).    
  The closer the group, the more the group becomes “high-entitative”, and the 
easier it is to direct it towards a goal (Brauer, Castano, Sacchi, 2009). Referring to wars, 
it is not easy to understand how they can motivate vast numbers of people. Peter 
Turchin (2009) explains that war (in particular WWI) in binding huge groups of 
unrelated people as a center of the “puzzle of ultra-sociality”. There is comfort and 
security with being in a group, and the perception of greater security in the international 
arena (Brauer, Castano, & Sacchi, 2009). This becomes the human quality that 
nationalists often tap into when diplomacy as talking fails and the strengthening of the 
state, particularly in a realist realm.  Oran Young (1989) explains that “wars are 
stimulated or even caused by the anarchical character of the state system” (p.216).    
Again, in defining globalization, Keynes biographer Professor Robert Skidelsky 
(2005) uses Wolfe’s assertion that it is an “integration of economic activities, across 
borders, through markets.” Though integration of global development outcomes has 
seen dramatic improvements across the international economies, with the numbers of 
wealthy growing, while at the same time, “globalization, development analysts agree, 
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has been a bonanza for the poor” (Pinker, 2018, p. 92). 
Transnational Corporations (TNC’s) have also grown in power and stature as 
independent bodies with growth rates exceedingly fast in the past three decades-the post 
WWII reopening of the world. Niall Ferguson (2009) referred to this as Globalization 
2.0 with more equalization and what has been referred to as a flat world (Friedman, 
2007). According to Santoro (2010), this has enhanced the need for those TNCs to 
consider their moral responsibility because “human rights transcend national laws” (p. 
290). The problems he argues are that TNC’s have the problematic question of how to 
neither directly, nor-indirectly (through complacency) decide how to act. The first is 
relationships, while the second is potential effectiveness, and the third is the ability to 
absorb the financial obligations to act. While these views are from a benevolent 
perspective, the problems are the metrics used to determine each of those points. 
Therefore, the bigger issue then becomes what is moral, and what special interest group 
has access to the individual manipulation to their ends. The argument, then, is a greater 
need that is required to reign in the issues from a policy perspective. 
2. Post-Westphalia and its Discontents  
“Healthy discontent is the prelude to progress” - Mahatma Gandhi 
   According to Baylis, Smith, and Owens (2011), since 1648 the basic 
international laws have been shaped by the Westphalia system of government, forming 
“the normative structure or constitution of the modern world order” (p. 23). Therefore, 
as a critical part of the international order that has facilitated the growth and shaped 
international law: states are sovereign, and, no matter the size, equal and not to be 
tampered with internally (Baylis, Smith, & Owens 2011). Of course, that definition 
precluded non-Christian nations, and thereby vetoing their opportunities for gaining 
proper statehood and allowing them to be subjected to colonialism. Much of the early 
time of international order was what Krasner (1999) referred to as “organized 
hypocrisy” for the benefit of those with the power.   
Contextualized, the system has proven to be highly innovative, efficient, and 
effective, though from a Euro-centric view. At the time it created a world that was 
unimaginable at the end of the 30 years’ war where there were French Catholics 
assisting Protestant Swedish envoys to get the concessions, as explained Henry 
Kissinger (1993). The concept at that time of the sovereign state not impinging on their 
neighbors was compared by Henry Kissinger (1993) to “a Swiss Alp in the desert”. The 
following centuries saw a competition for the ‘new world’, including the scramble for 
Africa in the 1885 Berlin Conference, and culminating at the expansion of pre-WWII 
when Japan’s Imperial ambitions continued in the ‘Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ 
were checked by war. While strong states, mostly European, operated within the 
Westphalia framework, the colonial impositions continued which was driven by 
conquest via technology that facilitated it (Hayes, Baldwin, & Cole, 1962; Allison, 
2017). 
Recently there have been threats to international order, and at the heart of the 
challenges to the Westphalia laws has been change that has in part been technologically 
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driven. This evolution, as Brian Arthur (2010) points out, all technology is 
interconnected and cannot occur without that which preceded. Technology has 
continued to add complexity to international relations as Transnational Corporations and 
Organizations have grown and become their own force (Kaletsky, 2010).  In 1996, John 
Perry Barlow highlighted the movement change through technology with “A 
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace”, which he declared that cyberspace 
overrode the state. So, it is no surprise that companies that grew out of doing business 
there were the latest and quickly became the biggest disrupter (Tapscott & Tapscott, 
2018). The results have been power shifts and globalization creating actors that have 
ramifications to sovereignty and to the ideals that were included in the Westphalia 
framework.   
    Solutions to implement the suggestions by Santoro have been made in a variety 
of ways, but generally imply larger government. Peter Drucker (1993) explains that the 
decline of the nation-state has been decades in the making, weakening the institutions to 
the point where what he calls transnational agencies (p.142). He continues to explain 
that the transnational agencies are necessary to combat important issues, like the 
environment, terrorism, and arms control (pp. 145-8). More recently, the arguments go 
further with area such as economic ones, as French President Sarkozy in 2010 at Davos 
advocated for “an unprecedented leap toward global government” (p. 332), and with 
that a greater governance in all forms. The movements seem to have governance in 
mind, but the structure of it remains uncertain.  Kreuder-Sonnen & Zangl (2015) argue 
that the Post-Westphalia order remains fragmented, with either a constitutionally 
organized international order, or an authoritarian one that international organizations 
will need to work under. The authors then conceptualize the two orders, with a scale that 
follows: democratic, partially democratic, hybrid, partially autocratic, and autocratic.  
   Articulated earlier, the biggest recent interrupter globally, of course, has been 
technology driven by the internet as the main facilitator of the free flow of ideas that 
have allowed the volume of ideas to flow. But, as explained by Tapscott and Tapscott 
(2018), the results for democracy have been mixed (p. 212). However, one way for 
TNC’s and democratic institutions themselves, is through the market, via blockchain 
advancements. According to Tapscott and Tapscott (2018), it could change the level of 
financial transparency with the ability—through smart contracts—to tie payments to 
performance and even facilitate transparent elections. Thus, through the market could 
result in a freer society and more responsibility directed to the financial end of TNC’s 
(and further negate a possibility of international authoritarianism). 
  Conversely, it is an authoritarian regime that has had the most effective 
pushback against technology in order to push their state autonomy back towards the 
Westphalian traditions. A trend towards that is found in China, where the realist 
perspective was implemented by the authoritarian regime (Pinker, 2018), making it rank 
the “worst in the world for internet freedom”, according to the Financial Times (Feng, 
2017). The results are that those TNCs that did not follow Beijing’s wishes were simply 
shut out of the domestic market (something that is jarring to anyone transiting in a 
Chinese airport without WeChat and other “China friendly” apps).      
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3. Historical Perspectives on Nationalism in International Relations 
Nationalism, the “collective group identity that passionately binds diverse 
individuals into a people…with the nation the highest affiliation” (Jones, 1988, p. 409), 
tends to direct actions and interactions of state actors. While it seemed that nationalism 
was waning after the end of the Cold War, there has been a shift since that time away 
from the liberal international order. So, as nationalism is revived, it is important to take 
note of it in all of its forms, as it leads to different reactions in diplomacy, making its 
relevance critical in the study of IR.   
As argued by Heiskanen (2019), the ontology of modern international relations 
is inherently dependent on nationalism, even when it appears to remain ineffective and 
absent. Different aspects of nationalism are rooted in the concept of sovereignty. 
Eventually, these act as the ontological cornerstone of modern IR, though many people 
believe that nationalism becomes important only when the international order is in 
crisis.  
Group cooperation in various forms, evolving from family units and tribalism to 
survive has been omnipotent for the continuation of the species. Francis Fukuyama 
(1992) explains that nationalism is relatively new because it replaces “lordship and 
bondage with mutual and equal recognition” (p. 266). The dangers of irrational growth 
of nationalism are exacerbated when populism ensures that mobilization of the nation 
takes place at the behest of mass hysteria, which was prominent at the end of the 
monarchies. In his book Mobs, Manias and Hysteria, Gustave Le Bon (1895/2014) 
explains that nationalism was harnessed for political gains from the time of the French 
Revolution, but later refined by the Spanish in 1873, where “Long live the federal 
republic” became the rallying cry that people addressed each other in the streets (p. 87).  
 Disseminating ideas to as wide an audience as possible has always (and 
continues) been important to successful propaganda implementation. One of the more 
egregious examples was what grew out of post-WWI Germany as the country was still 
dealing with the reparations and punishments that were forced upon it and the aptly 
named “National Socialists” who took advantage of the domestic situation to grab 
power. To illustrate how nationalism is derived from media, Sheldon Wolin (2008) 
begins the preview of his book Democracy Incorporated by describing the scenes from 
Leni Riefenstahl’s Nazi propaganda film ‘The Triumph of the Will’ as an example of 
technology harnessed towards moving public opinion towards nationalism.  
   Utilizing modern technology for mass manipulations were part of what Edward 
Barneys wrote in his 1928 book Propaganda, which he referred to as “new 
propaganda”, with changes that incorporated (motion picture technology) quite 
differently from two decades earlier in allowing for easier shaping mass psychology and 
creating situations that swayed entire populations. Collective groupthink continues as 
seen in the post-9/11 time period which offered anecdotal evidence with slogans that 
were on cars and t-shirts stating: “United We Stand” (Brauer, Castano, & Sacchi, 2009), 
and more recently with social media worldwide, so the trend continues towards the risk 
of more use of propaganda furthering nationalist agendas. 
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    Recent changes in many countries, including an inward-looking America have 
shown the changes to earlier assumptions. As Kiseleva (2009) put it a decade ago, 
“Now nationalism is on the rise. It can stir up a lot of negative feelings across many 
nations and roll over national boundaries causing conflict and strife.” Therefore, the 
author contends that answers to nationalism might be to look back at realism for insight 
on policy to deal with and mitigate the issues. While talking with Niall Ferguson, Henry 
Kissinger recently stated that the United States and China are now at the foothills of a 
war—with terrible consequences should tensions not be lowered (Chandler & Elegant, 
2019).    
    Often, government use of nationalism comes after misuse of regulation, driving 
more and further interventions. As Von Mises in Human Action (p. 823) explains: 
“Aggressive nationalism is the necessary derivative of the policies of interventionism 
and national planning”.  After decades of governmental meddling in markets and all 
areas of societies, the shift towards more nationalism may be the result of several 
factors.    
    There are of course dangers to world peace, as nationalism tends to less liberal 
order and a move back to a realist view of international relations.  Almost three decades 
after his seminal work, Francis Fukuyama now fears that it also is on the rise and is 
leading to less democracy (Tharoor, 2018). All of which leans towards the worst kind of 
diplomacy, as it is what Walter Jones (1988) claims: “a potent factor in the causal chain 
to war” (p. 410).    
  On the other hand, whether the benign sounding “post-modern nationalism” that 
some have labeled “Canadian nationalism”, as a self-preservation against America 
(Thomas 2018), or more radical forms such as in America today, it does not necessarily 
lead to conflict. This is seen in numerous examples, such as Hayek’s self-generating 
regimes which are likely to develop and then work in collaboration, explains Orin 
(1989), where spontaneous cooperation likely emerges (pp. 50-1). Thus, many of the 
international organizations have materialized to work together towards mutually 
beneficial ends in open-to-entry regimes (Orin, 1989, p. 51). 
4. Post-WW2 Globalization & Human Development  
The year 2020 marks three quarters of a century since the end of WWII and the 
rebirth of globalization, after a pause that began with WWI (Ferguson 2005). Since that 
time, the world has done very well economically and the overall betterment of humanity 
continues, in particular global development. This is the era that has been referred to as 
“development” because of the dramatic economic growth after the war.  Development 
studies, according to Sachs (2009), was born at the end of WWII, as a way of “…
preparation of blueprints for the postwar reconstruction of eastern and southern Europe” 
(p. 5).   
For this time of growth Skidelsky (2009) marks 1951 as the start of the “Golden 
Age” of development, with the end in 1973 (just after Bretton Woods had collapsed) 
(pp. 116-126). A similar time frame, 1945–1975, Sachs (2009), while quoting Steven 
Marglin, calls it “the golden age of capitalism”. However, even after the end of that 
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period (early 1970s) until 2018, according to the World Bank, global GDP has gone up 
six times (from 14 trillion to 84 trillion) (worldbank.org). This achievement is more 
dramatic when juxtaposed with other advances in humanity, as the population today is 
estimated at 7.75 billion, but stood at 2.3 billion at the end of WWII. From 1973 the 
population had not quite doubled (to about half of what it is today) to just under 4 
billion (Emmott, 2013).  
In other words, at the time when population grew exponentially, economies grew 
at an even faster rate, creating what Matt Ridley (2010) calls “affluence for all”. This is 
because “The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better” (p.15) with the 
aggregate poverty rates continuing to decline, even with the exponential increase in 
human population. Poverty has been reduced in the previous 50 years more than in the 
last 500 years (Ridley 2010), or as Steven Pinker (2018) put it during that time “the 
majority of the human race has become much better off” (p. 113).   
One of the detracting arguments to global development is that inequalities 
continue to exist, and there are a number of issues that continue to dog different parts of 
societies. Most notably the issue of inequality, which has been pointed to as a problem 
for the current world. Thomas Pickety (2017) published his long research project that 
looked at inequalities from the economic perspective in his book Capital, with the 
results showing that various inequalities between rich and poor exist. Sachs (2009) 
contends that there have been failures with “…billions of people excluded from 
globalization by globalization” (p. 15). As mentioned by David Landes, “The gap in 
wealth and health that separates rich and poor is the greatest single problem and danger 
confronting the twenty-first century” (Greig, Hulme, & Turner, 2007, p. 1).  
    Yet the counter to that is that even the poorest countries today have improved the 
living standards of most of their citizens, as the overall index of metrics continue to get 
better, with overall rising standards. An example is the poorest country in the world, 
Burundi, with a level of poverty that is as bad as the world gets (Ventura 2019). As one 
enters the country there are options that are open to anyone, from Wi-Fi to high end 
coffee (Miller, 2019). While the majority of the population lives at the low end of the 
international scale, the absolute poverty of starvation has been largely reduced (though 
not eliminated) as the number of starving has declined and the level of education has 
grown (Hurst, 2016).  
     One metric that is used by economists to measure inequality is with the Gini 
coefficient. “At zero, people all earn the same thing. At 100, the rich get all the income” 
(Bonner & Rajiva, 2007 p. 199). However, not all economists prefer it, as Thomas 
Piketty (2017) calls the measurement “synthetic… mix very different things, such as 
inequality with respect to labor and capital”. Instead, he tries to contrast “things as 
precisely as possible” (p. 243). Of course, Von Mises (1963) points out: “Economics 
deals with real man, weak and subject to error as he is, not with ideal beings, omniscient 
and perfect as only gods could be” (p. 97). So, according to some mainstream 
economists, there is a gulf between the rich and the poor that they are trying to measure 
and explain, but overall the majority are much better off.   
    While there are inequalities, when measuring global success, an area that helps 
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to illustrate overall positive changes that have occurred since renewed globalization and 
development, is the “theory of time-prices” (Maher, 2019). That is the working time it 
takes to purchase something, which allows for greater consumption if the overall 
working time to buy something drops (Maher, 2019, Tupy, 2019).  The assertion is that 
more or less universally “time-prices have plunged nearly 65% since 1980” (Maher, 
2019), with air conditioners falling 97% since the development era began (Hammond & 
Pooley, 2019). This is because air conditioners took the average blue-collar worker 203 
hours to buy 5,500 BTU’s, but only 5.56 hours today. George Gilder (2019) points out 
that “Tupy and Pooley estimate that since 1980, while the world’s population increased 
71%, time-prices dropped 72%”.   
     Von Mises (1963) in Human Action noted, “What those people who ask for 
equality have in mind is always an increase in their own power to consume” (p. 840). 
Economist Joseph Stiglitz (2002) states that “What is needed are policies for 
sustainable, equitable, and democratic growth. This is the reason for development. 
Development is not about helping a few people get rich or creating a handful of 
pointless industries that only benefit the country's elite” (pp. 251-2). It is hard to argue 
with that statement, the problem is that many mainstream economists argue for more 
regulation and greater intervention, hampering free choice. More, not less, regulation 
towards what von Mises (1963) explains, “Laissez faire means: Let the common man 
choose and act; do not force him to yield to a dictator” (p.732). To do otherwise is, to 
paraphrase the motivational psychologist Dr. Dennis Waitley (1984), “that which we 
fear most, we ourselves bring to pass”—in other words unfair markets with restricted 
access to wealth creation and governments creating protection for those in power.  
5. Power in International Politics: Insights from evolutionary biology 
   Robert Keohane (1986) started his book “World politics today is a matter of life 
and death” (p. 1), and therefore understanding how it is structured is crucial. There is an 
interesting joke that illustrates power dynamics in human interaction: The golden rule is 
that those who have the gold make the rules. So, to explain that in an international 
sense, Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005) begin their article, “The concept of 
power is central to international relations” and they then go on to explain the 
importance of how that takes place in a system of international anarchy. Within the 
international relations schools of thought, two contrasting theories have emerged that 
center on how states gain and retain power: the hard approach contrasted with the soft 
approach. By looking at evolutionary biology there are clues as to why both approaches 
have some validity.     
   Robert Keohane (1986) explains that realist power is the coercive power or hard 
power (force) that a state actor uses to get what it desires. And, much of the current 
political lines can be explained in that way. As a case in point, Diamond (1997) explains 
the raw power of the Spanish to reshape the former vast empires that once ruled into the 
political lines of today. Meredith (2013) shows a more recent example can be shown 
with the 1885 Berlin Conference that reshaped Africa where many traditional linguistic 
and tribal boundaries were ignored as the continent was divided. Throughout the ages, 
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as argued by the realists, power plays a vital role in realizing the dynamics of war and 
peace, as well as determines the relations among different political communities 
(Schmidt, 2007). Hence, according to John Mearsheimer, “calculations about power lie 
at the heart of how states think about the world around them” (Schmidt, 2007, p. 43). 
     The concept of realist power has varying degrees of coerciveness with what 
Waltz (1999) and Carr (1964, in Barnett & Duvall, 2005) articulated as ‘hard power’ 
with an explanation for how the international system balances itself through self-
interested actions. Realists put international relations into different power organizations, 
with the interactions that are contingent upon how the interactions proceed. This is the 
stronger, at the expense of the weaker, force through their agendas. While this ”Darwin 
effect” has been invoked to explain the survival of the fittest, and as an excuse or 
justification for various types of aggressive behavior (De Waal (2009) likens it to the 
Gordon Gekko character from the film Wall Street, where the strong devour the weak), 
yet the former USSR is an example of the unsustainability of a hard power system. As 
opined by Wagner (2014), soft power is the more efficient and effective concept in 
today’s international politics due to its sustainability and endurance, rather than the hard 
power, which is less useful today.  
Again, evolutionary biology helps to explain why cooperation works, and De 
Wall (2009) calls it an evolutionary empathy, while Steven Pinker (2018) refers to it as 
‘our better angels’, and which he gives credit for humans being able to work together 
that leads to societies that function and interact with other societies. The lesson behind 
those are summoned up by Jared Diamond (1991) who explains (in The Third 
Chimpanzee) why cooperation is important, and how there is a connection between 
societies that survive and continue and those that do not. This important distinction is 
that there are the selfish and uncooperative groups that perish. In a later work, Diamond 
(2005) shows how societies can collapse when they try and fail to dominate others, with 
one example of the Vikings who died off after attempting to dominate (rather than work 
with) local indigenous communities. Boehm and Flack (2010) explain the importance of 
cooperation and trade in a slow timescale tends to grow networks as well as lower 
conflict, all of which helps to ensure survival. Ridley (2011) argues that conversely, 
societies that move from cooperation and trade regress, with the dramatic example of 
the natives of Tasmania who, after stopping all contact with the Australian continent 
moved dramatically backward in a few generations.     
One way to try and bridge the views of different viewpoints of analyzing IR 
situations is through a taxonomy by Barnett and Duvall (2005), with four areas of 
power: compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive. These are transmitted 
through the following four: specific/direct or diffuse/indirect from which Barnett and 
Duvall created a grid referring to as a taxonomy in order to classify the ways that power 
plays out in international relations and what they suggest as “see power’s multiple 
forms” (p.43).  However, traditional Realist approaches as there are at present 196 
countries that are listed with the UN, and with it there are curious anomalies with those 
that are quite powerful in the sense of persuasiveness, yet lacking military might. While 
Canada falls under the umbrella of America, New Zealand is a better example of a 
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country with a limited military, hard power, and one that is far more persuasive in its 
abilities that are what Joseph Nye (2005) called ‘Soft Power’ which can be quite 
legitimate as seen in those two examples.    
Both forms of persuasive (hard and soft) behavior are alive within international 
relations to varying degrees, and there tends to be swings towards harder and softer 
approaches. David Brooks (2007) uses evolutionary biology to show the selfish brutish 
Hobbesian view of human nature as what drives social behavior towards self-
preservation and dominance. De Waal (2009) counters this conservative rightwing 
viewpoint as something that is articulated as a reason for less government and 
regulation, and free-market economies as a “half-truth” (p. 204-5). This leaves open the 
other half, and that is cooperation as necessary for survival.   
6. Case Study: Transformation of the GME & The Bush Doctrine 
 The Greater Middle East (GME) is a geo-political term defined by Ottaway, 
Marina, and Thomas (2004) at the Carnegie Endowment to explain Bush’s G-8 meeting 
agenda that year. It is the area “including not only the Arab world but also Afghanistan, 
Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey” (Ottaway, Marina, & Thomas, 2004). The overriding 
connection within the parameters of the GME is that it is the birthplace of three (of the 
five) main religions of the world, with the Islamic faith by far the region’s biggest; ‘so it 
should have been more peaceful’, Lebanon’s Middle East Time’s Claude Salhani (2009, 
p. 171) points out. In recent history it has been anything but peaceful, and the most 
recent American foreign policy doctrine, the Bush Doctrine, has proven to be 
controversial at best, and a failure at worst (Renshon, 2007; Salhani, 2009; Forte 2012).  
 September 11 is a watershed day for Americans after the 2001 terrorist attacks, 
and there was much speculation as to the importance of the day. The emergency phone 
number in America (911) seemed to be the main focus for many commentators. 
However, for the Islamist terrorists the day was symbolic because the Battle of Vienna 
took place on the day that ended the Muslim army’s advancement in Europe—
something that is well remembered within the region (Carter, 1985; Armstrong, 2001).   
Thus, a continuation of a long antagonistic relationship between the Islamic 
world and the West including the Crusaders going into the Middle East, something that 
is remembered throughout the region (Armstrong, 2001; Carter, 1985). While the 
Crusades may not have lasting success, much of the region was later subjugated, and 
therefore “the region’s politics, culture, and economy have been influenced by external 
powers of the western world” (Aminch & Houweling, 2007, p.59).   
The divides with Islam run deep as there are two competing major sects: the 
Shia and Sunni, which started with the Battle of Karbala on October 10, 680 
(Armstrong, 2001). The Pew Research Center (2012) found that “in most countries at 
least 40% of the majority Sunnis do not accept Shias as legitimate followers of the 
Islamic faith, with those in the GME “most keenly aware” of differences. This sectarian 
divide has been a major factor in the region’s divisions, with the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution a watershed moment, and a sticking point to this day with not only other 
Sunnis but America (Carter, 1985; Haberman, 2020). Kicking out western influence and 
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then taking 52 American hostages still resonates in the United States as seen with the 
January 2020 Trump threat to bomb 52 sites in Iran, including cultural ones, if needed 
(Haberman 2020).    
     For those realists in power such as Richard Haas, American roles in policing the 
world were becoming more important and needed to be increased “to an imperial level” 
in 2000 (Aminch & Houweling, 2007, p. 66). Haas (2017) later states that the United 
Nations propelled this with the “Responsibility to protect” in 2005. This he explains is 
important for America to remain active in order to prevent another Rwanda (pp. 
114-116).  
Yet, the objectives of the world’s only superpower in Iraq were not being met, 
which created a “puzzle in realist theory” (Aminch & Houweling, 2007, p. 65). In 2004, 
the United States was the monopolistic power in the world, with 65% of total world 
military power (Aminch and Houweling, 2007, p. 62), and for realist power that meant 
it should achieve its objectives quickly and efficiently, but it is clearly not working for 
the United States. There are, however, continuing arguments in favor of the realist 
perspective as a solution for the region. Kenneth Waltz (2012) argues in Foreign Affairs 
that only by having a nuclear-armed Iran will  the region gain a balance of power (with 
Israel being the other half of the equation), as he dismisses the idea that there will be a 
nuclear arms race. He cites India and Pakistan as the example to follow as those two 
states act as rational powers.  
A recent example of failure in Iraq is evident with the January 2020 resolution of 
the Iraqi government to ask US forces to leave the country (Berger, 2020).  Aminch and 
Houweling (2007) would like to suggest that Realists fail to recognize the micro-level 
foundation of politics (p. 69), and that there is no “homo-politicus” (p.70) to explain 
states behavior. Ironically, the authors use the example of owners of a firm enriching 
themselves as they bankrupt a company—this was something former  US president 
Donald Trump was personally successful in his private business in Atlantic City as his 
companies went bankrupt (Johnson, 2017; O’Brian, 2004).  
The other theory is classical liberal theory as applied to the Middle East 
(particularly in Locke’s tradition), which requires that all areas should be opened to 
maximize efficiency and become molded into the Wilsonian ideal (Aminch & 
Houweling, 2007, p.73). The problem is that it is the self-interests that seemed to be 
driving an amnesic US foreign policy.   
  The region has had a long and varied history (Armstrong, 2001; Carter, 1985) 
but according to Salhani (2009), much of American foreign policy tends to ignore the 
lessons of history when it comes to the Middle East. As history tends to repeat itself 
more often than we care to remember, or admit, “… nor can history be ignored as the 
George W. Bush administration tried to do” (Salhani, 2009, p. 23).  Though, for the US, 
one part of the liberalism agenda is to ensure that America is on the “Right side of 
history” (Aminch & Houweling, 2007, p.74). This from the country with collective 
amnesia and the attitude of many decision makers that “We are history’s actors and you, 
all of you, will be left to study what we do” (Aminch & Houweling, 2007, p. 66). Bush 
himself was clearly not concerned about history when asked about how history might 
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judge him when he stated, “We won’t know. We will all be dead” (Hybel & Kaufman, 
2006, p. 127). 
Bush Doctrine in the Middle East 
The term the “Bush Doctrine” was used by the conservative columnist Charles 
Krauthammer in June of 2001, just a half year into the presidency, describing the inward 
looking American foreign policy (Krauthammer, 2001, Renshon, 2009). This doctrine 
was greatly expanded after the 2001 attacks, and in 2007 (well into the second term of 
Bush) (Renshon, 2009). The actual implementation of this doctrine took the surprising 
form of a "preventative war--a war to stop a war. Furthermore, Schlesinger notes that 
the fact that Bush administration accomplished this "without igniting a national debate 
shows remarkable leadership skills."(Woodward, 2006, p. 371). However, according to 
Heisbourg (2003), this concept of preventive war was not what Bush believed. Rather, it 
is the complete opposite of the prevalent understanding of Bush Doctrine that assumes 
that America can use its force for fulfilling its objectives. This Bush Doctrine has 
significantly influenced the strategic interests of the U.S. allies, as due to the emphasis 
on preemption and prevention, the U.S. has departed from the strategies of its allies. 
    The US in the Middle East today is a crowded and difficult place to manage and 
derived from the 9/11 attacks in 2001. According to Renshon (2007), the later refined 
Bush Doctrine was a pushback that had five different objectives: American 
preeminence, assertive realism, strategic/stand apart alliances, new internationalism, 
and democratic transformation (pp. 14-21). It was the September 20th, 2001 Bush 
speech that gave the Bush doctrine direction with the promise to go to war with 
terrorism and the beginning of the next phase of the Bush Doctrine (Renshon, 2007). 
The recent adventurism that the Trump administration in Iraq against the Iranian 
general Soleimani shows a continuation of the doctrine —further justifying 
Schlesinger’s assessment as witnessed with recent actions within Iraq have proven that 
there are ongoing failures. The dramatic December 2019 siege of the US Embassy in 
Bagdad illustrate the ongoing influence of the Shiite backed Iranian forces in the 
country (Berger, 2020; Haberman, 2020). 
   The unintended consequences of continuous conflict (‘War on Terror’) have 
been substantial, including the dark war that took place around the GME (Forte, 2012). 
Iraq is the most prominent example of interventionism under the guise of the Bush 
Doctrine in the GME. Successive presidents, Obama and Trump, have both continued 
the policies to varying degrees. Obama was directly involved in the Libyan ousting of 
Ghaddafi in 2011 in Sirte which has led to a failed state (Forte, 2012; Saleh & England, 
2019).     
    One of the major problems has been the continuing “puzzle of how individual 
interests become aggregated into the liberal national interest” (Aminch & Houweling, 
2007, p.79). Russ Baker (2009) has made a case that both of the Iraq invasions were 
driven by the Bush family profits at the direction of the 41st and 43rd presidents. 
However, the most egregious examples may be found in the 45th president, Trump, who 
has been referred to by some psychologists as narcissistic (McClain, 2016). Prior to 
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getting elected, there were comparisons with Trump’s personal style and fascist leaders 
Hitler and Mussolini (McClain, 2016, pp. 75-79). He has influence on the entire social 
fabric of America (Singer, 2016, pp. 25-33), with dysfunction and narcissism. The 
Trump administration has continued to work within a dysfunctional framework, brought 
on from the top, according to Michael Wolf (2018).  
    The condition of America turning in while expanding its preemptive behavior 
has been extremely destabilizing for the Middle East. While it was a continuation of the 
policies that were implemented well before the Bush Doctrine, it was clearly refined by 
it. The traditional IR framework of liberalism and realist theories are helpful in 
explaining some of the failures of American policy in the GME (Aminch & Houweling, 
2007), and a better approach needs to be considered, as decades of failure have proven. 
In Human Action, Ludwig von Mises explained that, “To defeat the aggressors is not 
enough to make peace durable. The main thing is to discard the ideology that generates 
war” (p. 832).  
Can’t we all get along? 
Ever since humans have organized themselves into communities their success 
rates have increased, as they are by far the most dominant species on the planet. This is 
largely a result of organizing, first as groups, then societies that form as cultures 
develop. While human social evolution has seemed quite long, it is a recent 
advancement, and it is worthwhile to view the large international organizations through 
the lens of historical developments from different interdisciplinary vantage points to try 
and comprehend current events.  
Interdisciplinary studies have traditionally proven fertile grounds for 
collaboration between ideas (Ridley, 2010), so combining academic disciplines often 
creates unique perspectives. One example is when Dugger (1984) puts forth a 
progressive theory of evolution creating a framework around the theorists Thorstein 
Veblen and Peter Kropotkin to gain understanding of alternatives to social Darwinism. 
Another is deep-seated culture and human nature applied anthropologically to gain 
insight to anarchy by Snyder (2002). With those concepts as a backdrop, the question of 
whether the world is heading towards anarchy and a new international Post-Westphalia 
order, or reverting to the norm is explored.    
Evolutionary biology helps to explain what Dugger (1984) calls the dichotomy 
of selfishness and competition when working together for group survival. While Pinker 
(2018) likens the phenomena of overall unselfishness as “our better angels”, with the 
selfish gene being overrated—because at the group level it is often suppressed. 
Veblen’s “law” describes the importance of cooperation because “…mutual aid is as 
much a law of animal life as mutual struggle” (Veblen as quoted in Dugger, 1984), as it 
leads to greater survival rates and group success. Applied to international relations, this 
helps explain how there are seemingly altruistic actions, as well as coming together to 
coordinate financial and other cooperative ventures, within the confines of the state 
instead of Darwinism on the individual level. Following a long history where states 
found cooperation, rather than only working on selfish means, the Treaty of Westphalia 
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organized a cooperative agreement. Later, the Vienna Congress was another that 
allowed for a peaceful Europe for almost a century (Kissinger, 1994, p. 2001). 
Snyder (2002) believes that culture contributes to change, and “There is no 
reason to believe that future anarchical systems will be limited only to the patterns 
observed in the past” (p. 11). Snyder (2002) defines culture (following Clifford Geertz) 
as “a system of symbols that creates meaning with a social group”. Though not all 
forms were peaceful, as “…anthropologists find the frequency and intensity of war 
correlate with a generalized culture of mistrust, fear, and harshness in social 
relationships” (Snyder, 2002, p. 29).  
Dugger (1984) explains that Veblen distinguished the move from savagery 
(individual striving to survive) to barbarism (groups fighting other groups in anarchy), 
which was the growth of civilizations and organized political systems. This movement 
was facilitated by the growth of the family unit, and concepts of private property – and 
therefore the cultural organization. This facilitated “An economic surplus” (Dugger, 
1984, p. 979) as it gave rise to the state functioning as a constitutional authority, 
allowing for economy and wealth accumulation. Thus, a bigger group, the state benefits 
the most from cooperative effects.  Dugger (1984) makes the case that the larger the 
group, the more important cooperation is for evolution. So, following the collapse of the 
Roman Empire, groups were self-organized into villages, later city states, and finally 
states—leading to further stability and ultimately the success seen today (Dugger,1984) 
in an anarchist system.   
So much of international relations (IR) theory at times can seem academic and 
often in the realm of theory without grounding in the real world: the debate between 
Nozick and Rawls as “two bookends of theory” is an example (Schaefer, 2008). In 
contrast, the frequently-used IR term ‘anarchy’ brings forth images of lawlessness and a 
breakdown of social norms. In mid-2019 as Hong Kong descended into street battles 
between protesters and police, an op-ed in the South China Morning Post described the 
breakdown of “…violent street clashes. The sheer senselessness of it all is truly scary” 
(Fong, 2019). This anarchy was where mobs of anarchists destroyed the MTR (the 
commuter train) and vandalized shopping malls of Yuen Long and Sha Tin. The deeper 
epistemological roots of the term is: ‘without a central authority’. Within those confines 
of a definition, the term anarchy fits the current world order that does not have an 
overriding central authority (Yau, 2019).   
Veblen found that cooperation and the standardization of a common culture 
meant that the governments were then under greater scrutiny (Dugger, 1984). Therefore, 
coercion into organizations that are too large does not always work, as Drucker (1993) 
calls mega-states that forcibly take over smaller ones as they grow (with Nazi Germany 
and the USSR as examples), “a total failure” (p. 131). It was, after all, partly through the 
failure of religious based organization that led to the rise of the modern state (Kissinger 
2001) after a treaty to end the European religious wars in the towns of Osnabruck and 
Munster in modern day Germany.  
The Peace Treaty of Westphalia “emerged the novel principle that all 
independent sovereign states, regardless of size, were essentially equal”. With the result 
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of a greatly diminished church, “the pope could no longer speak with spiritual authority 
to all the rulers” (Hays, Baldwin & Cole 1962, p. 404). Kissinger (1993) contends that 
the European state system, arising out of Westphalia in 1648 was the start of balance of 
power politics after the collapse into ashes of universal empire. The balance of power of 
the states meant the “goal was not peace so much as stability and moderation” 
(Kissinger, 1993, p. 21). This did lead to stability, though later international systems – 
the Congress of Vienna and the post WWII American system were “the most stable” 
(Kissinger, 1993, p. 27).     
Huntington (1996) explains that “The international system was the Western 
Westphalian system of ‘civilized’ nation states and the colonial territories they 
controlled” (p. 52). The result is that the anarchy metaphor is employed to “provide an 
image of nation-states that consider every option available to them and make choices 
independently in order to maximize their own returns” (Stein, 1986 p.116). 
Bellamy and Williams pinpoint a 1999 speech by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair 
that ushered in the “Post-Westphalia era” (2010, p. 37).  It was likely much earlier with 
the end of WWI and the attempt of the League of Nations “…resembled an international 
government…” though was different in reality (Hayes, Baldwin & Cole, 1962, p.733). 
The League’s Covenant kept the sovereign state, while at the same time moving away 
from anarchy with sanctions that included both military and economic actions (Dunne, 
2011). The great war (WWI) breakdown of the Congress of Vienna, which abruptly 
halted globalization up to that point, resulted in a post-war world that demanded 
international order (Kissinger, 1995). Reflected in that was the Wilsonian attempt at 
governance through the League of Nations. Of the 12 points, most were looking towards 
a world of cooperation. The failure of the League was assured when even Wilson’s own 
government did not approve America’s involvement (Dunne, 2011; Kissinger, 1995), 
and it took another world war, and then a bipolar world to restart the post-Westphalian 
liberalism.  
7. Conclusion 
The WWII post-war order and the pushback against the USSR that led to the 
main actors, as Allison (2017) stated: “the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and trade (to provide basic global 
economic order); The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the US-Japan alliance (to 
ensure Japan and Europe were deeply integrated into the campaign against the Soviet 
Union); and the United Nations –—all as building blocks of a global order they sought 
to construct, floor by floor over decades” (p. 205).  The last decade of the 20th century 
saw dramatic changes in the old-world order of bipolarity. The crumbling of the USSR 
left many with the impression that the liberal order had triumphed (Fukuyama, 1992). 
However, the realist perspective within the world has reaffirmed its place with its 
distinctive head again as the rise of China, a more assertive Russia along with an 
America that is pulling back, creating a much more multi-polar world that is far from 
the ‘New World Order’ and the centralized authority that many conspiracy theorists had 
feared.  
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    With the end of the Cold War that saw a change in a bipolar hegemonic system, 
a change in international relations took place with liberalism appearing to prevail 
(Dunne, 2011; Kissinger, 2001; Fukuyama, 1992). The term “New World Order” was 
used to encapsulate the times, with Fukuyama (1992) calling the rise of liberalism “the 
end of history”. With it a move of international organizations towards one (of several) 
forms of “Post-Westphalia”, ranging from what Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl (2015) 
ranked between constitutionalism and authoritarianism.   
    Understanding the reality (the ‘is) and theory (‘ought’), according Snyder 
(2002), should be central to international relations scholarship (p. 41) rather than where 
it often is: “at the level of abstract philosophy and visceral morality” (p. 9).  Thayer 
(2004) states that the “evolutionary theory allows international relations scholars to 
generate insights into specific issues in the discipline” (p.11) and “the causes of war and 
ethnic conflict…” (p. 13). So, with a lessening of the influences of international systems 
and a move away from cooperation, there is a possibility that international relations are 
moving towards a post-post Westphalian world.  Thus, continued anarchy has been the 
trend (Kreuder-Sonnen & Zangl, 2015), as international regimes continue to transform 
and reduce cooperation, strengthening a move back towards an anarchistic international 
order. 
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